Foreign Competition, Market Power and Wage Inequality: Theory and Evidence by George J. Borjas & Valerie A. Ramey
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
FOREIGN COMPETITION, MARKET




Working Paper No. 4556




We wish to thank Cameron Odgers, Farshid Vahid, and Joao Issler for outstanding research
assistance and Garey Ramey and Vince Crawford for helpful suggestions. We both gratefully
acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation. This paper is partof
NBER's research program in Labor Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and
not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #4556
December 1993
FOREIGN COMPETITION, MARKET
POWER, AN]) WAGE INEQUALITY:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present theory and evidence on the link between wage inequality and
foreign competition in concentrated industries. We develop a simple model in which the impact
of foreign competition on the relative wages of an economy depends on the market structure of
the industry poetrated. We show that the more concentrated is the industry, the greater is the
impact of trade on general wage inequality. We use the theory to argue why import competition
in an industry such as automobiles is much more deleterious to the wages of the less educated
than import competition in an industry such as apparel. We then test our hypothesis using a
panel data set on relative wages across SMSAs. We reinterpret our model as a model of !ocal
economies, and test it using both the cross-sectional and time-series variation across labor
markets.
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and NBER and NBERA great deal of recent research in labor economics attempts to document and
analyze the huge increase in earnings inequality that occurred in the 1980s. The basic
facts, documented in Bluestone and Harrison (1988), Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy and
Murnane (1992), and Murphy and Welch (1992) are clear: Earnings inequality and the
returns to skills increased substantially beginning in the late—1970s. There was a sizable
increase in the wage ratio between highly educated and less educated workers; a rise in the
wage ratio between workers with many years of experience and new labor market entrants;
an increase in wage inequality among workers within education and experience levels; and
an increase in wage inequality among workers in narrowly defined occupation and industry
cells.
Although the by—now voluminous literature agrees on these facts, there is much less
consensus on the causes of the increase in earnings inequality. Indeed, it seems that a
whole new academic industry has developed in which almost every new paper (including
this one) attempts yet again to tell a simple story that explains the basic facts.
Several non—mutually exclusive factors have been emphasized as the possible cause
of the secular trends in earnings inequality. In an early phase of their work, for instance,
Murphy and Welch (1989) argued that the aging of the baby boom, and the resulting
decline in the number of new college entrants entering the labor market, may be
responsible for the increase in the wage premium accruing to college graduates. Another
strand of the literature (Bluestone and Harrison, 1988) argues that the changing industrial
mix of the U.S. economy, particularly the shift away from the manufacturing sector and
towards service industries, may be partly responsible for the trends. Other researchers
(Freeman, 1991) argue that the deunionization of the American economy and/or the
decline in the real minimum wage over the 1980s (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman, 1990)
1removed the "safety net" supporting the unskilled wage level. Still others argue that the
increasing internationalization of the U.S. economy, either through international trade
(Murphy and Welch, 1991; Johnson and Stafford, 1992) or through immigration (Borjas,
Freeman, and Katz, 1992) may account for the secular trend in earnings inequality.
Bishop (1991) even argues that the decline in the quality of American education at the
grammar and high school levels, as exhibited by the decline in SAT scores, has lowered the
marketability of unskilled workers. Finally, even after accounting for all these factors, a
large fraction of the increase remains unexplained and hence some researchers invoke
"skill—biased technological change" as the key factor underlying the secular trend in
earnings inequality (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Davis and ilaltiwanger, 1991; Mincer, 1991;
Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993).
In a companion paper (Borjas and Ramey, 1993), we offered our own explanation for
the trends in wage inequality. We argued that the trade deficit in durable goods and the
average log wage differential between college graduates and less educated workers share the
same trend. To illustrate the similarities in patterns of the two series over the last 40
years, Figure 1 graphs the trade deficit in durable goods as a percent of GDP against the
average log wage differential of college graduates and high school dropouts, standardized
for experience.' The graph shows that wage inequality rose during the 1950's, fell during
the first half of the 1960's, rose again from 1965 to the early 1970's, fell during part of the
1970's, and then skyrocketed during the 1980's. The graph also shows that the trade
deficit in durable goods as a percent of GDP followed much the same pattern, hitting peaks
'The wage data are drawn from the 1964—1991 Annual Demographic Files of the Current
Population Survey, and from the 1950 and 1960 U.s. Decennial Census, and are
standardized for experience. The method of constructing the aggregate data is similar to
the method used for the SMSA data analyzed later in this paper; the difference is that only
males are included in the aggregate data and that wages are adjusted for experience rather
than age.Imports and exports and GDP are in 1987 dollars, and are drawn from
CITIBASE.
2and troughs at the same time as the wage series. The only deviation between the two
series occurs during the last few years when wage inequality continued to rise, while the
trade deficit improved. Murphy and Welch (1992) were the first to note the similarities in
patterns, but argued that durable goods trade was only one of several explanations. The
graph shows that the trade deficit alone does very well in tracking the movements in wage
inequality.
The same statement is not true for the trade deficit in nondurable goods. Figure 2
graphs the trade deficit in nondurable goods as a percent of GDP against the average log
wage differential of college graduates and high school dropouts. Although the nondurable
good trade deficit also rose during the 1980's, its earlier behavior was very different from
that of the wage inequality series. Thus, the two variables do not appear to share the same
long—run trend.
In Borjas and Ramey (1993), we used cointegration analysis to confirm the
impressions from the graphs. That analysis showed that for the period 1963 to 1988, of the
leading explanations for the trends in wage inequality, only the durable goods trade deficit
had the same long run trend as the wage inequality series. While many of the other
variables, such as de—unionization and R&D expenditures, also showed substantial
increases during the 1980's, their trends in the early periods were very different from those
in the wage inequality series.
In this paper, we present a theoretical interpretation of the time series results, and
test the theory using a panel data set on relative wages across SMSA's. Our mainidea
may be stated simply: imports of durable goods have a strong impact on wageinequality
because of the structure of the industries that produce durable goods. Many ofthese
industries are highly concentrated, earn significant rents, and share those rentswith less
educated workers by paying them higher than average wages. An increase in imports
3lowers the rents of these industries, leading to a decline in the relative wage of less
educated workers. To illustrate this idea, we develop a simple two—sector model in which
one of the sectors is governed by an oligopoly. We show that the more concentrated is the
industry, the greater is the impact of trade on general wage inequality. We use the theory
to argu why import competition in an industry such as automobiles is much more
deleterious to the wages of the less educated than import competition in an industry such
as apparel. We then test our hypothesis using a panel data set on relative wages across
SMSA's. We reinterpret our model as a model of local economies, and test it using both
the cross—sectional and time—series variation across labor markets.
As has been noted by Karoly and Klerman (1991), there is substantial variation in
the secular trends in wage inequality across regions. Some areas of the country experienced
a substantial increase, while other areas experienced little, if any, increase.Using
regression analysis, we find that the fraction of workers in highly concentrated industries in
a local labor market has a significant effect on the overall relative wage in that labor
market. Furthermore, we find that foreign competition in the form of immigrant workers
has a statistically and economically significant adverse effect on the wages of the less
educated. These results hold for a variety of specifications. Thus, we conclude that there
is strong evidence linking the secular trends in wage inequality to the increasing
internationalization of the U.S. economy.
I. A Model of Trade, Market Power, Unions arid Relative Wages
A.Overview
A standard competitive equilibrium model of trade predicts that increased imports
will raise the college premium if the traded goods sector uses a higher proportion of less
educated workers than the non—traded goods sector. The standard model, however, cannot
4explain why trade in different goods should have differential impacts on the college
premium, when the different goods have roughly the same proportions of less educated
workers.
Why does an increase in net imports of durable goods have a greater impact on
relative wages? There are two related characteristics of these industries that distinguish
them. First, the industries that produce durable goods tend to be more concentrated and
have higher profits than other industries. For example, the four—firm concentration ratio
in 1972 was 99 percent for passenger cars and 90 percent for turbines and turbine
generators, while it was 9 percent for women's apparel (Scherer (1980, Table 3.5)).These
high concentration ratios tend to manifest themselves in the performance of the industries.
For the period 1946 through 1973, the average rate of return in the automobile industry
was 16 percent, as opposed to 8.1 percent for all corporations and 9.2 percentfor all
manufacturing corporations (White (1982)).Second, workers in more concentrated
industries tend to earn higher wages. Belman and Weiss (1988) have found the elasticity of
the wage with respect to concentration to lie in a range between 0.07 to 0.20. They found
that much of the effect operated through unions, but that there was significant effect that
operated independently of unions. Furthermore, Krueger and Summers' (1987, 1988)
industry wage premia suggests that durable goods industries have higher wage premia.For
example, the premium for total compensation in 1984 is 0.244 in motorvehicles and parts,
while it is —0.123 for apparel.
We consider the following story to be a plausible explanation for the link between
trade in durable goods and wage inequality:Most of the workers in durable goods
manufacturing are high school dropouts or high school graduates. Theseworkers tend to
share the rents in their industry in the form of wage premia; workers in industrieswith
larger rents earn a higher premium. When foreign firms enter the market, they capturea
5portion of the industry rents. This entry leads to an increase of the relative wage of college
graduates in two ways. First, because the rents of domestic firms have decreased, the wage
premium of workers remaining in those industries decreases. Second, to the extent that
foreign competition leads to lower employment levels in the concentrated industries, many
of the workers must move to the lower paying competitive sectors of the economy.
Overall, the wage of less educated workers falls relative to college educated workers.
B. Model
We formalize this story in the context of a simple model. For a single country, we
analyze the general equilibrium of the domestic economy, and take imports as exogenous.
Consider an economy with two sectors, 0 and 1, that produce two consumption goods, x0
and x1, and that use two types of labor, educated labor E and less educated labor L. We
begin by analyzing sector 1, which is the noncompetitive sector.
1. Cournot Oligopoly
There are a variety of ways to model market power. We choose the Cournot
oligopoly model because it gives a simple and intuitive measure of market power. Suppose
sector 1 has n firms that behave as Cournot oligopolists participating in a symmetric
equilibrium. Foreign firms also produce this good, and they export an exogenous amount
x to the domestic economy. Total demand for the goodx1 is given by:
(1)p1 = —
wherep1 is the price of the good relative to the price of the other good in the economy, and
6andare positive parameters.2
The demand curve perceived by each domestic firm i is given by:
p1 a0 —a1[x11 +(n_1)xj +
where x1 is the amount produced by firm i, Xjisthe amount produced by each other
domestic firm, and 4isthe exogenous amount supplied by foreign firms. The key
assumption of the Cournot model is that each firm takes other firms' quantities as given.
We assume that only less educated labor is required to produce x1.This
assumption captures the notion that the concentrated sector is a more important employer
of less educated workers than of educated workers. The production function for firm i is
simply
x1 =
whereis the number of less educated workers employed by firm i in sector 1.
We assume further that each firm bargains with a union over wages and
employment. In the Nash bargaining framework, the firm and the union jointly maximize




w0, the wage in the competitive sector,is the opportunity cost of labor. The wage w1 will
2Later in this section, we will specify the consumer optimization problem from which this
demand function is derived.
7be set so that workers receive the competitive wage plus a fraction 'y of the rents;
depends on the exact specification of the union's objective function. For simplicity, we will
assume thatis constant.3









The workers employed by the firm receive the wage:
(2)w1 =w0+ 7
Under the assumption of a symmetric equilibrium, domestic industry output is
simply nx1. Thus, total labor used in industry 1 in the domestic country is given by:
.—w —x
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Thespecification of the interaction between the firm and the union is identical to the one
used in Abowd and Lemieux (1992).
8Note that the wage w1 is not allocative, in the sense that labor demand does not depend on
w1. This fact implies that the demand for laborin this sector will generally not equal the
supply of labor to this sector. We assume that the parameter values are such that supply
always exceeds demand.
We will now discuss the partial equilibrium effects of imports on this sector, taking
the rest of the economy as given. First, it is clear from equation (2) that an increase in
imports decreases w1. An increase in imports leads to a decline in rents, so the wage
premium declines. We can also study how this effect differs when the concentration of the
industry changes. A natural indicator of market power in our model is n, the number of
firms in the oligopoly; if n is unity, the industry is monopolistic; as n increases, the
industry becomes more competitive. Market power affects the wage only through its effect
on rents per worker. It is easy to see from equation (2) that 82w1/(0n84) > 0. That is,
the more competitive the industry (the larger the n), the lower the rents per worker and
hence the smaller is the decline in wages.
It is also useful to discuss the interaction of imports and concentration on the wage
bill of sector 1, which is w1L1. We must now be careful when we change n, though,
because varying n changes the relative size of the industry. As is dear from equation (3), n
affects the size through the factor For the same value of [a0—w0—a1x]/&1, a more
concentrated industry will be smaUer than a less concentrated industry. If we simply
calculated the partial derivative 52(w1L1)/8nTh4, we would be determining not only the
impact of market power on import effects, but also the impact of changing the size of the
industry. Thus, in order to isolate the effects of changing the market structure, we must
make adjustments so that the industry size does not change when n changes.4 There are a
4Changing the size of the industry tends to have effects in the opposite direction of those of
changing market power. In particular, an increase in imports into a larger industry results
in a greater decrease in employment in that industry.
9variety ways of making this adjustment, such as changing the demand parameter a. The
easiest way is to multiply L1 in equation (3) by the factor (n+1)/n before taking the
derivative of a(w1L1)/&4 with respect to n.
When we make the adjustment, we see that:
8(wL) f 11 =20—w0—c1x1)J(n+1)2>
0.
On Ox1L1 invariant ton
Thus, the negative impact of imports on the wage bill is stronger when the industry is more
concentrated, holding industry size constant. This partial equilibrium result will form the
basis for a similar result in the economy—wide equilibrium model.
2. Rest of the Economy
We now briefly sketch the structure of the rest of the economy. Industry 0 is the
competitive sector. We assume that the production function for this industry is
Cobb—Douglas, with inputs of educated E and less—educated labor L0. Maximization of
profits gives the following first—order conditions:
(4)w0 =/3Lg—'E1,
(5)we =(1_fl)LgE.
where w0 is the wage of less educated workers in this sector, We IS the wage of educated
workers, the price of x0 has been normalized to one, and i lies between 0 and 1. These
conditions simply equate the wage of each type of labor to its marginal product.
10To abstract from distributional effects, we assume there is a representative






Given prices, it is easy to show that the consumer's demand function for x1 is exactly as
given in equation (1). Because the consumer has no disutility of labor, he will supply his
labor inelastically, so equations (6) and (7) will hold with equality. The amount of labor
supplied to sector 1 will be determined by the demand for labor in that sector, rather than
by the consumer's choice because of the assumed presence of excess supply in equilibrium.
Thus, the supply of labor to the competitive sector 0 will be the excess of the labor
endowment over the amount of labor demanded by sector 1.
3 EquilibriumEffects of Foreign Competition
Because the system of equations is block recursive, we can determine equilibrium
w0, w1, we, L0, L1, and B using only equations,equations (2) —(7).The ratio of the
5Adding two types of consumers would only complicate the model, and would not change
the basicresults concerning the effect of foreign competition on relative wages.
11average wage of less educated labor to educated labor is a function of these variables, and
can be written as follows:
wL +wL wL average wage of less educated labor —00 1 1 —
r1+1 1
average wage of educated labor we
—L wL
—
Thus,the less educated to educated wage ratio varies with the wage bill in industry 1
relative to the wage bill in industry 0. To determine how the wage ratio varies with
changes i imports of x1, we need only determine how the relative wage bills vary.
We first establish the effect of 4onequilibrium wages and employment.
Comparative static exercises give the following results:
[n/(n+1)] /{1 + (1-fl)L2E] >0.
dx1
dL1 dL0 =— < 0.
dx1 dx1
dw0 a adL T =—l)LE_---<0.
dx1 dx1
dw dw 1_ j_i0 1 — — <
xl xl
Thus, an increase in imports of the good produced by the oligopoly leads to a shift in labor
from the oligopoly sector to the competitive sector, and decreases the wages of the less
educated workers in both sectors. Wages decrease in the oligopoly sector because rents
12have decreased. Wages decrease in the competitive sector because the supply of less
educated workers has increased.
Combining the results above, it is easy to show:
d[(w1L1 )/(w0L0)J<0.
dx1
Thus, an increase in imports of x1 shrinks the wage bill in sector 1 relative to the wage bill
in sector 0, resulting in an overall decrease in the average wage of less—educated workers
relative to educated workers.
The key question of interest, and the main point of the model, is how the impact of
foreign competition on relative wages varies with the amount of market power in the target
industry. The result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition: Consider an industry characterized by a Cournot oligopoly that engages in
Nash bargaining with its workers. If the industry is more concentrated (but does not
change in size), an exogenous increase in imports of the good produced by that industry
will have a larger negative impact on the economy—wide average wage of less educated
workers relative to educated workers.
The result is easily obtained by showing that:
d2(w1L1 )/(w0L0)]
I >0.
dii L1,L0 invariant to n
13In deriving this result, we apply the same adjustment factor as we did in the partial
equilibrium analysis above. The positive sign of the cross derivative implies that the
negative impact of foreign competition on wage inequality is less when the industry being
penetrated is more competitive.
Thus, the model presented in this section supports the intuition in the story we told
above. Imports into concentrated industries capture rents that would otherwise be shared
with workers in the form of wage premia. The effect should be greater in industries with
higher rents.
Thc model, while simple and specific, raises some very interesting questions. The
model suggests that the types of goods that a country imports and exports are important.
If import competition occurs in a sector with market power, the foreign producers may
capture many of the rents in that industry. To the extent that domestic rents are shared
with less educated domestic workers, a shift of industry rents abroad has a negative impact
on the relative wage of less educated workers. The effect is greater the more concentrated
the industry.
II.Evidence from Regional Differences
We now test our theory by reinterpreting the model as applying to different regions
of the country. The key assumption required to apply the model in this way is that labor
is sufficiently geographically immobile. If labor were perfectly mobile across cities, relative
wages would be equalized across labor markets. If labor is partially immobile, so that
relative wage movements differ across regions, we would expect that those areas of the
country that lose more worker rents would experience a larger increase in the returns to
skill. We analyze this hypothesis by analyzing the determinants of the substantial
differences that exist in the wage structure across U.S. cities.
14A.Data
We use data from the 1977—1991 Annual Demographic Files of the Current
Population Surveys. The sample period is selected because the 1977 CPS is thefirst that
identifies a relatively large number of SMSAs, and because the measurement of a person's
educational attainment changed substantially beginning with the 1992 CPS. The data thus
allow us to track wage differentials across consistently—defined education groups for 44
SMSAs through the 1976—1990 period. We restrict our analysis to the sample of workers
(both men and women) aged 18—64 who worked full—time in the civilian sectorin the year
prior to the survey, who were not self—employed or working without pay,and who resided
in one of the 44 SMSAs that can be identified in each of the cross—sections (the SMSAs
included in the analysis are listed below).6
The wage variable used is the natural logarithm of average weekly earnings in the
calendar year prior to the survey. All wages were converted to 1982 dollars using the GNP
implicit deflator for personal consumption. We delete workers whose weekly earningsfall
below $67, and we recoded the wage measure for those workers whose earnings were
topcoded by multiplying the topcode value times 1.45 in each of the surveys.These
refinements of the wage variable match those used by Katz and Murphy (1992) intheir
comprehensive study of the wage structure. Our underlying wage data,therefore, is
roughly comparable to theirs.
Using the worker's completed educational atainment, we categorizeworkers into one
of four skill groups: (1) workers with less than a high school education (or "highschool
dropouts"); (2) high school graduates; (3) workers with some college education;and (4)
workers with at least a college degree. To obtain age—adjusted wagedifferentials across
6A worker is classified as working full—time if he works more than 48 weeks duringthe year,
and the usual work week lasts at least 30 hours.




where is the log weekly earnings of person i in calendar year t; X is a vector of
standardizing variables; S (j=1,...,4) is a vector of dummy variables indicatingthe
worker's educational attainment, where the j index corresponds to the education categories
defined above; and Cikt is a vector of dummy variables indicating the SMSA, with k
indexing the SMSAs. The vector of standardizing variables X includes afourth—order
polynomial in the worker's age; a dummy variable indicating the worker's gender;and a
dummy variable indicating if the worker is white or nonwhite.
The regression coefficients ''fromequation (8) are used to calculate two measures of
the age—adjusted returns to skills for each SMSA in each calendar year. In particular, we
calculate the standardized log wage differential between college graduates and high school
graduates ("whs"); and the standardized log wage differential between college graduates






where k indexes the SMSA and t indexes time.
It is well known that there are substantial differences across Census regions in the
level and secular trend of measures of income inequality (see, for example, Karoly and
16Klerman, 1992, and Topel, 1993). Table 1 reports the change in the relative wagefor the
44 SMSAs in our analysis between 1976 and 1990, while Figures 3 and 4 illustratethe
complete time—series for a number of selected SMSAs.
Itis evident that the phenomenon of increasing returns to skills was not
experienced equally by all metropolitan areas. The increase in the returns to skillsin some
metropolitan areas, such as Los Angeles, is roughly consistent with the aggregatetrend.
For example, college graduates in Los Angeles earned about 21.6 percent more than high
school graduates and 31.3 percent more than high school dropouts in 1976. By 1990,
college graduates in Los Angeles earned 41 percent more than high school graduatesand 84
percent more than high school dropouts. In contrast, other metropolitan areas,such as
Pittsburgh, barely experienced a change in the return to schooling over the period. College
graduates in Pittsburgh earned 39 percent more than high school graduatesin 1976, and
only 46.8 percent more in 1990.
B.Empirical Results
The main objective of our empirical analysis is to test whether our theory, which
was formulated to explain the aggregate times series behavior of wages, canalso explain
the inter—SMSA differences in the evolution of the wage structure during the 1980s.It is
obviously impossible to allocate directly the U.S. trade deficit to different areasof the
country. For example, imports of cars into California mightwell affect wages in Michigan
more than wages in California. The key factor is the change in the rents flowingto workers
in a city. Because it is difficult to measure these rents at the city level, as anindirect
measure, we use the fraction of the workforce in a particular communitythat is employed
in the industries targeted by foreign competition. Our theory implies that thosecities that
lost the most employment in highly—concentrated industries should have experiencedthe
17biggest changes in the wage structure. We discuss the definitionof the target industries
below.
We test the theory by regressing the measures of retunis to skill defined in
equations (9a) and (9b) on the industrial composition of the labor market in each city at
each point in time, as well as vectors of SMSA fixed effects and period fixed effects, and a
set of additional explanatory variables; the fraction of the adult population in the SMSA
that is foreign—born; the female labor force participation rate in the SMSA; and the
locality's unemployment rate. We discuss below the sensitivity of our results to the
inclusion of additional control variables (such as the unionization rate in the SMSA).'
The main set of regressions are reported in Tables 2 for the college—high school
dropout wage differential and in Table 3 for the college—high school graduate wage
differential. We begin the analysis by simply including in the regression a variable
describing the fraction of the workforce employed in the manufacturing industry in a
particular SMSA at a point in time. The first column of the tables documents a strong
negative correlation between the returns to skills (however measured) and the fraction of
the workforce employed in manufacturing.This correlation is not only statistically
significant, but is also numerically important. A 10 percentage point increase in the
fraction of the workforce employed in manufacturing decreases the college premium by
about 2 to 4 percentage points.
Columns 2 and 3 of the tables document that the negative correlation between the
relative importance of the manufacturing sector in a local labor market and the college
'The fraction of the adult population in the SMSA that is foreign—born is calculated from
the 1970 Census, the 1980 Census, and the 1989 CPS. We interpolated the intervening
years. We calculated the female labor force participation rate and the unemployment rate
in the SMSA from the March CPS. Finally, the fraction of the labor force in the SMSA
that is unionized is obtained from Curme, Hirsch and Macpherson (1990) and Hirsch and
Macpherson (1993).
18premium remains even if we include a vector of dummy variable indicating either the year
of the observation or the SMSA of the observation. These fixed effects regressions thus
indicate the presence of a negative correlation between the manufacturing employment
share and the returns to skills either in the cross—section or over time within an SMSA.
However, the inclusion of both SMSA and period fixed effects seems to remove much of the
variation in the data, so that the strong negative correlation between the manufacturing
employment share and the returns to skills vanishes.
We now allow for a more detailed specification of the composition of the
manufacturing industry in the community. We decompose manufacturing employment
into four categories:the fraction of workers employed in high concentration import
industries; the fraction employed in low—concentration import industries; the fraction
employed in other durable industries; and the fraction employed in other manufacturing.
Our theory suggests that changes in employment in the first of these categories should have
the greatest impact on the wage structure.
Selecting the target industries was complicated by the fact that concentration ratios
are usually reported for 4—digit SIC industries, whereas the Census classifications (CIC)
tend to be at the 3—digit level, and often do not have the same composition as 3—digit SIC
industries. We used the following procedure to select industries. We included any CIC
manufacturing industry in the high—concentration category if the majority of workers in
the industry were in 4—digit industries with 4—firm concentration ratios greater than 40
percent, based on the 1977 Census of Manufacturers. Based on thismethod we included
the following industries in the high concentration ratio group (the numbers in parenthesis
are the pre—1983 CIC codes): primary metals (139,147,148,149), enginesand turbines
(177), farm equipment (178), construction equipment (179), office equipment (188),
computers (189), household appliances (199), motor vehicles and parts (219),aircraft and
19parts (227), railroad equipment (229), photographic equipment (248), and watches and
clocks (249). All of these industries except for office machines and computers experienced
substantial declines in employment during the period of study. Furthermore, all of these
industries except household appliances had substantial wage premia in 1984, according to
Krueger and Summers (1988). In contrast, the low—concentration industries consisted of
two industries that experienced heavy import competition during the period, but which
generally had 4—firm concentration ratios under 40.These industries were apparel
(319,327) and leather products (388,389,397).
Figure 5 shows the percent of the labor force employed in highly—concentrated
import ind'istries by education in the 1976—1990 period. The data reveal two striking
facts. First, the target industries were more important employers of less educated workers
than of more educated workers at the beginning of the period under study. In 1976, for
example, 9 percent of high school dropouts were employed in these industries, as compared
to only 5 percent of college graduates. Second, the percent of less educated workers
employed in these target industries shows steep declines at the same time that their
relative wages decrease. In particular, the fraction of high school dropouts employed in
these industries declined from over 9 percent to under 4 percent between 1976 and 1990,
while the fraction of college graduates employed in these industries remained roughly
constant over the period.
The scatter plot of the relative wages (one observation for each year for each SMSA)
against the fraction of the labor force that is employed in high-concentration import
industries is illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. There is an obvious negative correlation
between the relative wage of unskilled workers in a community and the fraction of the
city's workforce employed in these target industries (the regression line illustrated in the
figures summarizes the simple correlation between the two variables).
20Column 5 of Tables 2 and 3 indicates that the negative correlation between the
returns to skills and the relative importance of the manufacturing sector in a community is
mostly attributable to the strong negative correlation observed between the returns to
skills and the percent of the workforce employed in high—concentration import industries.
For instance, a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of workers that are employed in
these industries increases the relative wage of high school dropouts by 7.7 percent, and that
of high school graduates by 4.2 percent.
The relative importance of employment in high—concentration import industries as
a determinant of the returns to skills is particularly evident in the regressions that include
vectors of period fixed effects and/or SMSA fixed effects. In every case, the coefficient on
employment in high—concentration industries is more negative than for employment in any
of the other industries. Employment in low—concentration industries often enters with a
positive sign. Even when the regressions control for both sets of fixed effects, the returns
to skills are still negatively correlated with the fraction of the workforce employed in
high—concentration industries targeted by foreign imports. In fact, the coefficients on the
share of employment in these industries are the only ones in the industry vector that
remain statistically significant in both Tables 2 and 3.
The regressions also include a number of control variables which have independent
effects on the wage structure. For instance, the fraction of the adult population that is
foreign—born consistently has a significant positive effect on the college premium, and
particularly on the relative wage of high school dropouts. The coefficient is not only
statistically but numerically important. Unskilled workers in cities with relatively large
immigrant populations have lower wages (relative to more highly educated workers) than
unskilled workers in other cities. Even after controlling for period and SMSA fixed effects,
a 10 percent increase in the fraction foreign—born lowers the wage of high school dropouts
21(relative to that of college graduates) by 5.5 percent.
The strong negative impact of immigration on the (relative) unskilled wage differs
drastically froth the findings reported by most studies in the literature (see Borjas, 1990,
for a survey of these results). Most of the studies analyzing the impact of immigrants on
the earnings of natives, however, are based on analyses of cross—section data, where the
wage of particular native groups in local labormarkets are correlated with the fraction of
immigrants in the population. Typically, these cross—section studiesfind only a slight
negative correlation between the presence of immigrants in the local labormarket and the
native wage (Grossman, 1982; Altonji and Card, 1991; and LaLonde and Topel (1991)).
More recent research (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1992) relates the time—series of the
wages of unskilled workers in the 1980s and the fraction of immigrantsin the economy, and
suggests that the sizable immigration of unskilled workers during this period may have
been an important contributor to the declining relative wage of unskilled workers over the
period. Our analysis, in effect, combines both the cross—section comparisons common in
the literature with the time-series analysis and reveals a significant adverse impact of
immigration on the unskilled relative wage.8
Recent work (Grant and Hamermesh, 1981, Topel, 1992) also suggests that the
entry of women into the labor market may have had a negative impact on the wage of
unskilled workers. Our regressions indicate that the labor market's female labor force
participation rate generally has a positive impact on the college premium as long as period
fixed effects are not included in the regression.In effect, removing the aggregate
8Some caution is required when using these results to infer the impact of immigrants on the
wage of native workers. The CPS does not contain information on the birthplaceof
workers, so that a part of the impact of immigration on the wage structure is probably due
to a change in the composition of the workforce. In particular, the entry of relatively
unskilled immigrants would reduce the wages of unskilled workers, even if immigrants had
no impact on the earnings of natives.
22time—variation in the data removes much of the perhaps spurious correlation between
changes in female labor supply and the returns to skills.
Finally, the regressions include the labor market's unemployment rate so as to
control for differential impacts of the business cycle. Tables 2 and 3 indicate a strong
positive correlation between the unemployment rate and the returns to skills after
controlling for period and SMSA fixed effects. In other words, unskilled workers are worse
off during periods of high unemployment.
C.Robustness of the Results
There is an important sense in which the regression results summarized in Tables 2
and 3 are not surprising.It is well known that workers in high—concentration import
industries earn more than other workers, so that a labor market with a higher percentage of
workers in these industries will necessarily have a higher average wage for its less educated
workers.As a result, the negative correlation between percent employed in
high—concentration import industries and the college premium can be interpreted as
tautological.
It is instructive, therefore, to investigate if spillover effects are sufficiently
important that the negative correlation persists even after we net out this compositional
effect- We do this by investigating if the industrial composition of the workforce has an
impact on the relative wage of unskilled workers employed outside high-concentration
import industries. Table 4 presents regressions identical to those reported earlier, except
that. the returns to skills have been estimated on the subsample of workers employed
outside the high-concentration import industries. To a large extent, these regressions
greatly resemble the ones reported earlier. There is, for example, a negative correlation
between the fraction of workers employed in the target industries and the college—dropout
23wage ratio. A 10 percent increase in the fraction of theworkforce that is employed in
high—concentration import industries increases the relative wage of high school dropouts by
8.1 percent, and that of high school graduates by 3.7 percent, even after controlling for
both SMSA and period fixed effects.
Our theoretical modelsuggeststhatthe importance of imports in
high—concentration industries on the wage structure works through the fact that these
industries are unionized. It is not surprising, therefore, that if the regressions also control
for the fraction of the workforce that is a member of a union, the coeffcient of the
high—concentration employment variable is weakened.
Table 5 presents the basic set of regressions which include the SMSA's unionization
rate. As expected, the unionization variable has a negative impact on the college premium
in the locality. A 10 percentage point increase in the unionization rate reduces the relative
wage of college graduates by .1 to .2 percent (depending on whether the base is high school
dropouts or high school graduates). It is important to note, however, that even though the
coefficient of the high—concentration import industries share is weakened, it remains
numerically and statistically significant even after controlling for period and SMSA fixed
effects. In particular, a 10 percent increase in the share of employment in these important
industries increases the relative wage of high school dropouts by 4.3 percent, and that of
high school graduates by 3.2 percent.
The empirical analysis presented in this section documents a relationship between
changes in employment in the high—concentration industries and changes in the wage
structure. Thus, the qualitative results support our theoretical interpretation of the time
series link between the durable goods trade deficit and aggregate wage inequality. An
interesting question to ask is whether the magnitude of the panel data coefficient estimates
can explain the increase in the returns to skills observed in the 1980s. To some extent, this
24experiment is biased against our hypothesis because we are assuming that there are no
spillover effects between cities; that is, the SMSA parameter estimates do not account for
the fact that the behavior of wages in one city may have an effect on the behavior ofwages
in other cities. Thus, the numbers obtained should be viewed as a lower bound.
Table 6 uses the basic regressions reported in columns 5—8 of Tables 2 and 3 to
ascertain the extent to which the secular trends in the returns to skills can be explained in
terms of changes in the explanatory variables. As reported in row 1 of the table, the
change in the log wage ratio between skilled and unskilled workers in our sample of 44
SMSAs was .195 for high school dropouts and .133 for high school graduates. During the
same period, the fraction of workers employed in high—concentration import industries
declined from 7.3 percent to 4.2 percent, so that this change in the industrial composition
of the labor market alone accounts for a 2.4 percentage point decline in the relativewage of
high school dropouts, and for a 1.3 percentage point decline in the relative wage of high
school graduates. In other words, this variable alone—which is a very rough proxy for the
impact of foreign competition of the wage structure—can explain about ten percent of the
decline in the relative wage of unskilled workers. Moreover, the calculations indicate that
even if we control for SMSA and period fixed effects, the employment decline in the target
industries still account for roughly 10 percent of the relative wage of unskilled workers.
The remaining rows of Table 6 illustrate the impact of changes in the other
explanatory variables on the secular trend in the returns to skills. For example, the
percentage of the work force that is foreign—born in the labor markets under analysis
increased from 8.9 to 14.8 percent between 1976 and 1990. As a result, the inflow of
immigrants accounts for about a 3 percentage point decline in the relative wage of high
school dropouts, but has only a slight impact on the relative wage of high school graduates
(particularly if SMSA and period fixed effects are included in the regressions).
25Finally, the regressions also indicate that the 11.2 percentage point increase in the
female labor force participation rate (from 56.3 percent in 1976 to 67.5 percent in 1990)
accounts for a substantial fraction of the increase in the returns to skills as long as period
effects are not included in the regression. Once period effects are accounted for, the impact
of the increase in female labor force participation disappears (and actually leads to a
reduction in the returns to skills). As noted earlier, the correlation between female labor
force participation and changes in the wage structure is to, a large extent, spurious.
ifi.Summary
This paper presents and tests the hypothesis that foreign competition in highly
concentrated industries was an important factor underlying the increase in the returns to
skills observed during the 19BPs. Our theoretical framework suggests that imports of goods
produced in concentrated markets have a much larger impact on the wage structure than
imports of goods produced in competitive markets.In particular, foreign competition in
concentrated industries transfers rents from less educated workers to foreign producers.
The more concentrated the domestic industry, the larger is the loss of rents and hence the
greater is the decline in the relative wageof less educated workers.
Because our hypothesis singles out particular sectors of the economy as responsible
for an important part of the trends in income inequality, we attempted to determine if
those cities that experienced declines in employment in high concentration import
industries are the cities that experienced the highest increases in income inequality. The
empirical evidence strongly supported our hypothesis.There is a strong negative
correlation between the share of employment in these industries in a labor market and the
relative wages of less—skilled workers both over time within a city, and in a cross—section
of cities. Furthermore, even when we do not allow for spillover effects between cities, the
26average change in the share of employment in the high—concentration industries over time
can explain ten percent of the average change in wage inequality. We also find that
immigration has a substantial impact on the relative wages of high school dropouts.
It might be hard to believe that such a small set of industries could have such a
tremendous impact. A deeper look, however, suggests that the hypothesis is not so
far—fetched.First, the trade deficit in motor vehicles and parts alone amounts to one
percent of GDP. If one believes that this industry has significant rents, then a large part of
the trade deficit represents oligopoly rents shifted to foreign producers. Second, the
evidence suggested significant spill—over effects for workers in the labor market not
employed directly in the target industries. If these spillover effects are also important in
the aggregate, then it is not as hard to reconcile the magnitude of the impact with the
small employment share of the industries.
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30TABLE I. RETURNSTOSKILLS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1976, 1990
LogWageRatioofCollcge
Graduatesto: Percent Emplovcd in:
High School HighSchool High- Sample
Metropolitan Area Year Drovouts GraduatesManufacturing Concentration Size
Import Industries
Akron. OH 1976 0.403 0.129 37.5 8.2 98
1990 0,656 0.289 31,2 5.2 130
Albany. NY 1976 0.790 0.517 22.3 4.4 115
1990 0.517 0.485 13.3 1.8 155
Atlanta. GA 1976 0.800 0.3 18 20.0 6.8 250
1990 0.719 0.444 14.6 3.7 283
Baltimore. MD 1976 0.618 0.458 22.5 4.5 406
1990 0.684 0.582 17.9 2.7 255
Birniinghanl.AL 1976 0.594 0.332 22.2 9.6 138
1990 0.851 0.726 14.7 3.4 127
Boston. MA 1976 0.561 0.272 27.5 64 376
1990 0.586 0.414 18.1 4.9 880
Buffalo. NY 1976 0.557 0,343 46.5 16.3 188
1990 0.385 0.224 31.7 8.0 137
Chicago,IL 1976 0.519 0.350 30.7 6.2 1261
1990 0.752 0.450 23.2 2.7 1123
Cincinnati. OH 1976 0.415 0.184 37.7 11.2 232
1990 0.665 0.421 27.7 4.5 276
Cleveland,OH 1976 0.456 0.271 42.9 14.5 364
1990 0.699 0.415 28.2 6.1 315
Columbus. OH 1976 0.352 0.2 10 16.6 3.0 147
1990 0.553 0.380 17.8 2,0 28l
Dallas. TX 1976 0.620 0.406 28.6 5.6 322
1990 0.841 0.474 22.3 2.4 411
Dcnvcr.CO 1976 0.458 0.290 19.3 4.0 386
1990 0,946 0.491 14.9 3.3 297
DcLroit.Ml 1976 0.538 0,380 41.0 25.6 632
1990 0.610 0.451 30.7 17.5 918
Fort Worth, TX 1976 0.394 0.299 29.3 11.2 171
1990 0,745 0.407 17.4 S.6 205
Gar.'.IN 1976 0.112 0.207 46.4 35.9 94
1990 0.803 0.583 33.5 17.8 30
Greensboro,NC 1976 0.531 0.296 45,8 0.6 11)6
1990 0.569 0,420 36.0 1.2 310
Houston. TX 1976 0.452 0.255 20.5 3.5
1990 0.877 0.513 11.3 1.3 476
Indianapolis. CA 1976 0.532 0.317 29.8 9.7 198
1990 0.650 0,410 26.7 3.8 69
Kansas City, MO l976 0.313 0.216 24.6 6.9 244
1990 0.437 0.340 9.9 1.2 278
Los Angeles. CA 1976 0.578 0.311 29.6 8.1 1320
1990 0,84! 0.471 25.8 54 1793
Nliani, FL 1976 0.735 0535 18.2 1.2 277
1990 0.846 0.467 12.1 0.9 413Milwaukee, WI 1976 0.553 0.337 38.0 14.4 254
1990 0.588 0.563 32.5 5.5 218
Minn.-St. Paul. MN 1976 0.589 0.446 27.2 4.7 350
1990 0.590 0.299 20.6 3.0 320
Nassau-Suffolk, NY 1976 0.471 0.281 19.0 5.1 412
1990 0.628 0.405 15.2 3.7 509
New Orleans. LA 1976 0.481 0.292 13.9 1.5 185
1990 0.815 0.669 5.3 0.0 115
New York, NY 1976 0.660 0.342 20.4 1.6 1357
1990 0.894 0.505 12.7 0.8 1604
Newark. NJ 1976 0.492 0.355 39.1 5.4 296
1990 1.100 0.520 24.7 2.8 482
Norfolk. VA 1976 0.745 0.567 19.3 5.5 104
1990 0.540 0.514 18.8 0.6 147
Patterson-Cliflon- 1976 0.688 0.350 35.1 2.1 256
Passaic. NJ 1990 0.845 0.521 26.8 3.0 357
Philadelphia. PA 1976 0.497 0.270 29.6 4,4 695
1990 0.760 0.482 22.0 2.6 884
Pittsburgh. PA 1976 0.618 0.387 35.1 15.8 385
1990 0.638 0.468 17.4 66 332
Poriland. OR 1976 0.428 0.187 18.8 3.9 155
1990 0.400 0.333 27.7 4.6 192
Rochester. NY 1976 0.275 0.159 45.6 28.2 151
1990 0.488 0.275 33.8 13.3 206
Sacramento. CA 1976 0.379 0.252 6.7 0.0 137
1990 0.844 0.531 11.7 2.7 178
SanBernardino. CA 1976 0.45 1 0.257 20.2 32 189
1990 0.706 0.502 20.5 4,9 261
San Diego.CA 1976 0.571 0.451 20.7 6.1 236
1990 0.887 0.579 20.5 2.8 228
San Francisco- 1976 0.3 12 0.210 16.3 3.2 549
Oakland. CA 1990 0.802 0.35 1 13.6 1.8 463
SanJose. CA 1976 0.558 0.359 36.9 10.4 227
1990 0.711 0.438 47.4 11.3 189
SantaAna. CA 1976 0.550 0.376 29.8 8.3 317
1990 0,771 0.416 26.5 3.9 318
Seattle. WA 1976 0.220 0.196 24.8 10.8 237
1990 0.532 0.293 24.9 10.7 247
St. Louis.MO 1976 0,574 0.351 27.9 7.8 385
1990 0.790 0,457 20.6 6.3 149
Tampa- 1976 0.506 0.301 17.0 0.7 172
St. Petersburg. FL 1990 0.718 0.523 11,8 1.9 374
Washington. D.C. 1976 0,711 0.336 5.0 1.4 738
1990 0.704 0.481 7.2 1.5 904TABLE 2
DETERMINANTSOF WAGE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEENCOLLEGE GRADUATES
AND1-UGHSCHOOL DROPOUTS
Regression
Variable LD I.) (4i () L)
Fraction of Workforce -.4393 -.3530-.6960-1536 --- —- --- -—
inManufacturing (.0604)(.0586)(.1259)(.1382)
Fraction in High --- -— -.7686-.7696-1.1531-.5076
Concentration (.1038)(.0983)(.2303)(.2350)
ImportIndustries
Fractionin Low --- --- --- -— .8047 1.7510 1.2226 1.8374
Concentration (.6475)(.6204)(.8078)(.7781)
Import Industries
Fraction in Other --- --- --- --- -.2632-.0505 -.4961 -.0083
Durables (.1227)(.1180)(.2129)(.2 123)
Fraction in Other --- --- --- -.1650 -.1593 -.6960-.2430
Manufacturing (.1586)(.1498)(.2626)(.2577)
Fraction of Population .5493 .4631 1.2825 .5450 .4532 .2888 1.3304 .5819
Foreign-Born (.0648)(.0629)(.1818)(.1990)(.0771)(.0751)(.1826)(.2010)
Fraction of Women .4663 .0250 .4895 -.19 IS .4375 -.0573 .4555 -.2164
in LaborForce (.0909)(.1064)(.1139)(.1503)(.0917)(.1055)(.1150)(.1501)
Uneniplovmeiu Rate .0739 -.2224 .4980 .7163 .1970 -.0376 .4843 .6975
(.1696)(.1896)(.1715)(.1979)(.1703)(.1872)(.1714)(.1978)
Includes Period No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed Effects
Includes SMSA No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
R-Squared .224 .307 .476 .536 .251 .350 .485 .543
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The regressions have 660 observations. The observations are
weighted b' the inverse of the sampling variance of the dependent variable.TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF WAGE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN COLLEGE GRADUATES
AND HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
Regression
Variable W (2) (2) (4)() 12)
FractionofWorkforce -.1801 -.0999 -.5073 -.0251 —- — —- —-
in Manufacturing (.042 1)(.0386)(0891)(0942)
FractioninHigh
--- —- -.4212-.4285 -.9441 -3542
Concentration (.0723)(0642)(.1631)(.1602)
Import Industries




—- -.0214 .1836 -.1550 .2716
Durables (.0857)(.0773)(.1507)(.1447)
Fraction in Other --- -— — -— .0006 -.0088 -.5658 -.1971
Manufacturing (.1108)(.0981)(.1857)(.1753)
Fraction of Population .1615 .0753 .5323 -.1677 .1240 -.0386 .5683 -.1408
Foreign-Born (.0454)(.0416)(.1298)(.1363)(.0542)(.0494)(.1302)(.1376)
Fraction of Women .2487 -.1870 .4017 -.2288 .2128 -.2625 .3564 -.2571
in Labor Force (.0634)(.0698)(.0808)(.1021)(.0642)(.0690)(.0815)(.1019)
Unemployment Rate .0149 -.2742 .2552 .4189 .0901 -.1358 .2232 .3903
(.1182)(.1248)(.1216)(.1349)(.1190)(1226)(.1214)(1348)
Includes Period No Yes No Yes . No Yes No Yes
Fixed Effects
Includes SMSA No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
R-Squared .083 .270 .359 .475 .111 .322 .371 .484
Notes; Standard errors arc reported in parentheses. The regressions have 660 observations. The observations are
vcighed by the inverse of the sampling variance of the dependent variable.TABLE 4
DETERMJNANTS OF RETURNSTOSKILLS FOR WORKERS EMPLOYED OUTSIDE
IMPORT INDUSTRIES WITH HIGH CONCENTRATION RATIOS
WageDifferential Between College Wage Differential Bet'een College
Graduates and High School Dropouts Graduates and High School Graduates
Variable (I) L) (4) LI)()() 14)
FractioninHigh -.3853 -.4135-1.5756-8071 -.3441 -.3511 -.9600 -.3693
Concentration (.1207)(.1 133)(.2734)(.2781)(.0742)(.0661)(.1678)(.1660)
Import Industries
Fraction in Low .5740 1.7696 .5157 1.3289 .0524 .9998 -.4592 .1272
Concentration (.7522)(.7130)(.9560)(.9170)(.4650)(.4190)(.5904)(.5515)
Import Industries
FractioninOthcr -.5317 -.2528 -.8921 -.3134 -.0484 .1588 -.1482 .2784
Durablcs (.1422)(.1355)(.2513)(.2499)(.0878)(.0794)(.1548)(.1498)
Fraction in Other -.3499-.3450-1.7181-1.1819-:0402 -.0465-.6768 -.3050
Manufacturing (.1839)(.1719)(.3080)(.3016)(.1133)(.1006)(.1906)(.1814)
Fraction of Population .4255 .2183 1.1927 .2692 .1215 -.0426 .5442 -.1585
Foreign-Born (.0893)(.0860)(.2152)(.2353)(.0553)(.0506)(.1333)(.1419)
FractionofWomen .2910 -.3268 .1122 -.7867 .1917 -.2957 .3230 -.2989
in Labor Force (.1060)(.1205)(.1350)(.1749)(.0655)(.0708)(.0835)(.1055)
Unemployment Rate .3339 .1029 .4500 .7332 .1011 -.1336 .1959 .3436
(.1984)(.2156)(.2033)(.2332)(.1219)(.1259)(.1248)(.1395)
Includes Period No Yes No Yes No Yes No Ycs
Fixed Effects
Includes SMSA No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
R-Squarcd .132 .270 .386 .461 .081 .295 .345 .454
Notes: Standard errors arc reported in parentheses. The regressions have 660 observations. The observations are
weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance of the dependent variable.TABLE 5
DETERMINANTS OF RETUUSTOSKILLS AFTER CONTROLLING FOR UNIONIZATION RATE
IN METROPOLITAN AREA•
WageDifferential Between College Wage DifferentialBetweenCollege
Graduatesand High School Dropouts Graduates and High School Graduates
Variable (fl () LU
FractioninHigh -.5302 -.5712 -.8168 -.4259-.2885-.3356 -.6709 -.3162
Concentration (.1070)(.1017)(.2431)(.2415)(.0753)(.0672)(.1716)(.1648)
Import Industries
Fraction in Low .83 18 1.7046 1.3445 1.8234 .1392 1.0496-.0689 .4294
Concentration (.6279)(.60-48)(.7989)(.7775)(.4456)(.4029)(.5661)(.5328)
Impori Industries
FractioninOther -.2630 -.0612-.3737 .0008 -.0197 .1792 -.0526 .2761
Durables (.1189)(.1150)(.2127)(.2121)(.0840)(.0763)(.1501)(.1449)
Fraction in Other -.0366 -.0522-.5405 -.2 147 .0724 .0416 -.4386 -. 1837
Manufacturing (.1550)(.1472) (.2625) (.2582) (.1095) (.0976)(1849)(.1739)
Fractionof Population .5018 .3438 1.2173 .5999 .1516 -.0121 .4786 -.1317
Foreign-Born (.0751)(.0738)(.1827)(.2012)(.0534)(.0492)(.1297)(.1379)
FractionofWomcn .2101 -.2066 .3179 -.2113 .0855 -.3318 .2485 -.2537
in Labor Force (.0955)(.1059)(.1189)(.1500)(.0675)(.0701)(.0837)(.1020)
Unemployment Rate .4674 .3054 .5046 .7198 .243 1 .0275 .24 12 .4009
(.1703)(.1917)(.1695)(.1982)(.1203)(.1271)(.1196)(.1353)
Fraction of Workforcc -.0054 -.0047 -.0062 -.0024 -.0031 -.0022 -.0050 -.0011
Unionized (.0008)(.0008)(.0016)(.0017)(.0005)(.0005)(.0011)(.0011)
Includes Period No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed Effects
Includes SMSA No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
R-Squarcd .297 .383 .497 .545 .146. .340 .391 .484
Notes: SLindard errors arc reported in parentheses. The regressions have 660 observations. The observations are
weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance of the dependent variable.TABLE 6
PREDICTING SECULAR TREND IN RETURNS TO SKILLS
Wage Differential Between College Wage Differential Between College
Graduatesand High School DropoutsGraduates and High School Graduates
LU LU LU LU LU LU
ActualChangeinLogWagcRatio .195 .195 .195 .195 .133 .133 .133 .133
Obscrved Between 1976 and 1990
Changein LogWage Ratio
AttributabletoChangein:
Fractionof Labor Force Employed .024 .024 .035 .016 .013 .013 .029 .011
in High-Concentration Import
Industries
Fraction of Labor Force That is .027 .017 .079 .035 .007 -.002 .038 -.008
Foreign-Born
Female Labor Force Participation .049 -.006 .051 -.024 .024 -.030 .040 -.029
Rate
















Figure 1. Durable Goods Trade Deficit and
the College—High School Dropout Wage Premium
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Figure 2. Nondurable Goods Trade Deficit and
the College—High School Dropout Wage Premium
I I I I I I
I' - 1.2998 ' —
—I),I
l4





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Figure 5. Percent of Labor Force Employed in Highly—















Figure 6. Scatter Between College/H.S. Dropout Wage Patio and
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Percent Employed in Highly—Concentrated Import IndustriesFigure 7. Scatter Between College/H.S. Graduate Wage Ratio and
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